1 Introduction Hotelling (1929) considers two competing businesses choosing where to locate on a street. He assumes that the businesses are identical and each individual patronizes only the one that is closest to where he lives. Miyagawa (1998) is the rst who studies this model from a normative prospective and identi es rules on the basis of desirable properties. He considers the problem of a state government having to choose two locations where to build two identical public facilities. An alternative speci es for each of the two public goods a location. Agents have single-peaked preferences on some interval of possible locations and consume the public goods without rivalry: given two alternatives, an agent prefers an alternative to another if there is a location which he prefers to each of the locations of the other alternative. We call this extension of single-peaked preferences from the set of possible locations to the set of alternatives its max-extension. 1 There are environments in which a g e n ts compare alternatives di erently. At e a c h point of time when an individual desires to consume the public good, he uses exactly one public good and therefore he has a single-peaked preference relation over the interval. However, sometimes it is not possible for him to consume the public good at his most preferred location. This could be due to several reasons, for example the good is used by other agents and therefore congested, or the good at his most preferred location is out of service. But primarily each agent consumes the good at his most preferred location. One example is where the town government locates two identical libraries on a street. If a certain book is not available at the rst choice library of an individual who wants to borrow it, then he has to consume his second choice library. In these contexts we propose the lexicographic-extension of preferences 2 : given two alternatives, rst an agent compares the most preferred locations of each of the two alternatives, and if there is a tie, then he compares the other locations. It turns out that this feature of preferences brings about results that are considerably di erent 1 from Miyagawa (2001a) .
A basic requirement i s Pareto-optimality, meaning that only e cient alternatives are chosen. Pareto-optimality is stronger in Miyagawa (2001a) than in our model. Indeed, except for preference pro les at which all agents have the same peak, each alternative that is Pareto-optimal with respect to the max-extension is also Paretooptimal with respect to the lexicographic-extension.
Our main property is a notion of fairness. If the environment of an economy changes, then the welfares of all agents who are not responsible for this change are a ected in the same direction: either all weakly gain or all weakly lose. As a variable parameter of an economy w h i c h may change over time, we consider preferences. Solidarity applied to such situations says that when the preference relation of an agent changes, then the welfares of all other agents are a ected in the same direction. This replacement principle is called welfare-domination under preference-replacement, or simply replacement-domination.
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In di erent settings the \replacement principle" has been studied. 4 It seems to be a general feature of this property that in any model any class of rules characterized by replacement-domination and certain other properties is restricted. The review of Thomson (1999) supports this statement. For two pure public goods and the maxextension, Miyagawa (2001a) shows that there are only two rules satisfying Paretooptimality and replacement-domination: the left-peaks rule and the right-peaks rule (for more details see Section 3). When considering the lexicographic-extension of preferences and therefore weakening Pareto-optimality, we show that Pareto-optimality and replacement-domination admit a large class of rules.
Each rule satisfying these properties is described by means of a xed continuous and single-peaked binary relation over the set of locations. For each preference pro le such a rule chooses one location to be a most preferred peak in the peak pro le according to the xed single-peaked relation. The second location is indi erent to 3 Moulin (1987) introduces replacement-domination in the context of binary choice with quasilinear preferences. He calls it \agreement". 4 It has been studied in private good economies with single-peaked preferences (Barber a, Jackson, and Neme, 1997 Thomson, 1997) , in classical exchange economies (Sprumont and Zhou, 1999) , in economies with indivisible goods and monetary transfers (Thomson, 1998) , and in one public good economies (Thomson, 1993 Vohra, 1999 Ehlers and Klaus, 2001 this peak according to the xed single-peaked relation such that, if Pareto-optimality is not violated, the locations belong to opposite sides of the peak of the xed relation. We call these rules single-peaked preference rules and characterize them by Paretooptimality and replacement-domination.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the general model and the axioms. Section 3 presents the de nition and the characterization of the single-peaked preference rules. Section 4 c o n tains the proof.
The Model
Let N f 1 : : : n g, n 2 N, bethe set of agents. Each agent i 2 N is equipped with a single-peaked and continuous preference relation R i over 0 1]. By I i we d e n o t e t h e indi erence relation associated with R i , a n d b y P i the corresponding strict preference relation. Single-peakedness means that there exists a location, called the peak of R i and denoted by p(R i ), such that for all x y 2 0 1], if x < y p(R i ) o r x > y p(R i ), then yP i x. By R we denote the set of all single-peaked preferences over 0 1], and by R N the set of (preference) pro les R (R i ) i2N such that for all i 2 N , R i 2 R. Given S N, R S denotes the restriction (R i ) i2S of R 2 R N to S. Given R 2 R N , p(R) denotes the smallest peak in the pro le (p(R i )) i2N , and p(R) the greatest peak in the pro le (p(R i )) i2N .
We choose the locations for two identical public goods in 0 1]. Let M f 1 2g.
Each a g e n t has the freedom to choose the public goods he prefers. Therefore, the order in which we locate the facilities is irrelevant. An alternative is a tuple x (x 1 x 2 ) such that 0 x 1 x 2 1. We denote by 0 1] M the set of alternatives. Note that (1 0) is not an alternative.
Each a g e n t compares two alternatives via the lexicographic preference r elation over 0 1] M induced by his single-peaked preference relation over 0,1].
Lexicographic-Extension of Preferences: Let i 2 N and R i 2 R. Given two alternatives x y 2 0 1] M and two permutations of M such that x (1) R i x (2) and y (1) R i y (2) , x is lexicographically strictly preferred t o y if and only if either x (1) P i y (1) or (x (1) I i y (1) and x (2) P i y (2) ). Furthermore, x is lexicographically indi erent to y if and only if x (1) I i y (1) and x (2) I i y (2) .
Abusing notation, we use the same symbols to denote preferences over possible locations and lexicographic preferences over alternatives. When we extend preferences lexicographically, weak upper contour sets are neither closed nor open, and nonconvex. Furthermore, indi erence sets only contain a nite number of alternatives. Figure 1 illustrates this fact. . As we will show, this \slight" change in weak upper contour sets and indi erence sets brings about conclusions that are considerably di erent from those in Miyagawa (2001a) .
A (decision) rule is a mapping ' that associates with each R 2 R N an alternative, denoted by '(R) = (' 1 (R) ' 2 (R)). Pareto-optimality says that for each preference pro le the chosen alternative cannot be changed in such a way that no agent is worse o and some agent is better o . Given S N and R 2 R N , let E(R S ) denote the set of Pareto-optimal (or e cient) alternatives for R S . Formally, E(R S ) = fy 2 0 1] M j for all x 2 0 1] M , if for some i 2 S, xP i y, then for some j 2 S, yP j xg.
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Pareto-Optimality: For all R 2 R N , '(R) 2 E(R).
For Pareto-optimality to hold it is not su cient that for each public good the selected location belongs to p(R) p(R)]. For every chosen alternative i t i s necessary that the closed interval having as two endpoints the two selected locations contains at least one peak. The straightforward proof is left to the reader. Lemma 2.2 Let ' be a rule. Then ' satis es Pareto-optimality if and only if for all R 2 R N the following holds:
By Lemma 2.2, the set of e cient alternatives depends only on the peaks of the pro le.
Remark 2.3 For all R 2 R N , let E(R max ) denote the set of Pareto-optimal alternatives in 0 1] M when we extend preferences maximally. It is easy to see that for all x 2 0 1] M , x 2 E(R max ) if and only if (i) x 1 x 2 2 p(R) p(R)] and (ii) for some i j 2 N, p(R i ) p (R j ) 2 x 1 x 2 ], x 1 P i x 2 , and x 2 P j x 1 . For the lexicographic-extension of preferences, Pareto-optimality is weaker than for the max-extension. For all R 2 R N such t h a t p(R) < p(R), E(R max ) E(R). Generally the set E(R) is considerably larger than E(R max ). For example, let R 2 R N be such t h a t fp(R i ) j i 2 Ng = f0 1g.
The solidarity p r o p e r t y w e discuss is welfare-domination under preference-replacement, or for short replacement-domination, i n troduced by Moulin (1987) . It requires that when the preference relation of some agent changes, the welfares of all other agents are a ected in the same direction.
Replacement-Domination: For all j 2 N, and all R R 2 R N such that R Nnfjg = R Nnfjg , either for all i 2 Nnfjg, '(R)R i '( R)] or for all i 2 Nnfjg, '( R)R i '(R)].
3 Single-Peaked Preference Rules Miyagawa (2001a) shows that when n 4 and we extend preferences from 0,1] to alternatives maximally, only the following two rules satisfy Pareto-optimality and
, and otherwise, L(R) (p(R) minfp(R j ) j j 2 N and p(R) < p (R j )g).
Right-Peaks Rule, G: For all R 2 R N , i f p(R) = p(R), then G(R) (p(R) p(R)), and otherwise, G(R) (maxfp(R j ) j j 2 N and p(R j ) < p(R)g p(R)).
By Lemma 2.2, the left-peaks rule and the right-peaks rule satisfy Pareto-optimality. However, both rules violate replacement-domination when agents compare alternatives lexicographically.
Example 3.1 Let n 3 a n d R 2 R N be such t h a t p(R 1 ) = 0 , p(R 2 ) = 1 2 , p(R 3 ) = 1 , and for all i 2 Nnf1 2 3g, p(R i ) 2 f 0 1g. Let R 2 R N be such t h a t R Nnf2g = R Nnf2g
. Then L(R) = (0 1 2 ) and L( R) = (0 2 3 ). In particular, L(R)P 1 L( R) and L( R)P 3 L(R). Thus, the left-peaks rule violates replacement-domination. Similarly, t h e right-peaks rule violates replacement-domination.
A \constant" rule selecting for each preference pro le the same alternative satis es replacement-domination, but not Pareto-optimality. Therefore, in our model Paretooptimality and replacement-domination are independent.
Each rule satisfying Pareto-optimality and replacement-domination is described by a continuous and single-peaked binary relation over 0 1]. Here is an example of such a rule when the single-peaked preference relation is continuous and symmetric around the peak Denote by a its unique xed point a n d by F the set of all such functions.
Single-Peaked Preference Rules, f : Given f 2 F , t h e single-peaked p r eference rule f based on f is de ned as follows. For all R 2 R N such that p(R i 1 ) Each single-peaked preference rule satis es anonymity (the rule is symmetric in its arguments) and coalitional strategy-proofness (no group of agents can gain by jointly mispresenting their true preferences), as the careful reader may c heck. Therefore, other rules than rules choosing for each public good the corresponding location according to some median operation may satisfy strategy-proofness and additional axioms.
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Note that we do not require the above properties, they are implied by Pareto-optimality and replacement-domination.
Finally we discuss the location of three public facilities. The result of Miyagawa (2001a) generalizes to these cases as follows: 7 If n 5, then a rule satis es Paretooptimality and replacement-domination with respect to the max-extension if and only if either for all pro les the three di erent smallest peaks are chosen, or for all pro les the three di erent greatest peaksare chosen.
It is not obvious how to extend a single-peaked preference rule to the location of three goods. There are two single-peaked preference rules which can be extended in a straightforward way: it is the rule choosing for all pro les and all facilities the smallest peak (call this rule the smallest-peak rule) and the rule choosing for all pro les and all facilities the greatest peak(call this rule the greatest-peak rule ).
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The smallest-peak rule and the greatest-peak rule satisfy Pareto-optimality and replacement-domination with respect to the lexicographic extension when we locate three facilities.
Proof of Theorem 3.3
Throughout this section let n 3 and ' bea rule satisfying Pareto-optimality and replacement-domination. The following implications will be useful.
First, we prove that for any two e cient alternatives, if all agents are indi erent between them, then the two alternatives are the same. Proof. Let j 2 S besuch that p(R j ) = m i n i2S p(R i ). Since x y 2 E(R S ), p(R j )
x 1 x 2 and p(R j ) y 1 y 2 . Because xI j y, it follows that x 1 = y 1 and x 2 = y 2 . Hence, x = y.
Second, if the preference relation of some agent c hanges and the choices of the rule at the initial and at the new pro le are Pareto-optimal for the pro le consisting of the remaining agents' preferences, then the same alternative i s chosen for both pro les. Third, if the preference relation of some agent changes and all Pareto-optimal alternatives at the new pro le are also e cient for the pro le consisting of the remaining agents' preferences, then all these agents weakly prefer the alternative c hosen by the rule for the new pro le to the initially chosen alternative. Lemma 4.3 Let j 2 N and R R 2 R N be such that R Nnfjg = R Nnfjg . If E( R) = E(R Nnfjg ), then for all i 2 Nnfjg, '( R)R i '(R).
Proof. By replacement-domination, either for all i 2 Nnfjg, '( R)R i '(R)] or for all i 2 Nnfjg, '(R)R i '( R)]. Suppose that the assertion of Lemma 4.3 does not hold. Thus, for all i 2 Nnfjg, '(R)R i '( R), and for some h 2 Nnfjg, '(R)P h '( R). Because E( R) = E(R Nnfjg ), '( R) Proof. Suppose that for some R 2 R N and some j 2 N,
Without loss of generality, w e suppose that j = 2 f 1 2g, p(R 1 ) = p(R), and p(R 2 ) = p(R). By successive applications of Lemma 4.2 we may assume that for all i 2 Nnf1 2 j g, p(R i ) = p(R j ).
Let R 2 R N be such that R Nnf2g = R Nnf2g and R 2 = R j . Thus, E( R) = E(R Nnf2g ). By Lemma 4.3, for all i 2 Nnf2g, LetR 2 R N be such thatR Nnf1g = R Nnf1g andR 1 = R j . By the same arguments as in Claim 1 it follows that ' 1 (R) = p(R) = p(R j ). To summarize, Claim 1, the previous fact, replacement-domination, a n d (1) imply that and (5), the previous relations contradict replacement-domination.
9 Note that when N = f1 2 3g we cannot conclude '(R 0 ) = '(R).
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The remaining proof of Theorem 3.3 is divided into two parts. In the rst part we show Theorem 3.3 when N contains three agents. In the second part we use the three agents case to establish Theorem 3.3 for the general case. Three Agents Case: N = f1 2 3g.
We show that ' satis es anonymity and peaks-onliness.
Lemma 4.6 ' satis es anonymity, i . e . for all permutations of N, '(R) = '( (R)). 
Without loss of generality, w e suppose that
Let R = (R 1 R 2 R 2 ). By Lemma 4.2, '( R) = '(R). By Lemma 4.4, '( ( R)) = '( R). Thus, by the two previous facts,
Next, we determine '( (R)). If ' 1 ( (R)) ' 2 ( (R)) 2 p(R 1 ) p (R 2 )], then '( (R)) 2 E(R 1 R 2 ). Hence, by Lemma 4.2, '( (R)) = '( ( R)). By (6), '( (R)) = '(R), which is the desired conclusion. Suppose that ' 2 ( (R)) > p(R 2 ). Thus, by Lemma 4.5, ' 1 ( (R)) p(R 2 ). Let R = (R 2 R 2 R 3 ). Thus, by Lemmas 4.2 and 4.4, '(R) = '( (R)). We distinguish three subcases. Subcase 2.1: ' 1 (R) = ' 2 (R) = p(R 2 ).
By Lemma 4.2, '(R) = '(R). By Lemma 4.4, '(R) = '( (R)). The previous two equalities contradict '(R) 
Subcase 2.2: ' 2 (R) < p (R 2 ) < ' 1 ( (R)). Then '( R) = '(R) and '(R) = '( (R)). Using the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 4.5 we derive a c o n tradiction to replacement-domination. Subcase 2.3: ' 2 (R) = p(R 2 ) ( o r p(R 2 ) = ' 1 ( (R))). 10 As usual, (R) i s t h e p e r m uted pro le R according to .
By Subcase 2.1, ' 1 (R) < p(R 2 ). By Lemma 4.3, '(R)R 2 '(R). Thus, ' 1 (R) = p(R 2 ). By Lemma 4.4, '(R) = '( (R)). Thus, p(R 2 ) < ' 2 (R). Hence, by '( R) = '(R), ' 1 ( R) < ' 2 ( R) = p(R 2 ) = ' 1 (R) < ' 2 (R). Using the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 4.5 we derive a c o n tradiction to replacement-domination.
Using similar arguments as in Lemma 4.6 it follows that ' satis es peaks-onliness.
Lemma 4.7 ' satis es peaks-onliness, i.e. for all R R 2 R N , if for all i 2 N,
We construct a function f 2 F and show that ' = f . Before we de ne f we introduce additional notation. Given 
